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TORTS: THE NON-USER SECOND COLLISION
PLAINTIFF: OUTER LIMITS OF
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS LAW?
LOAN AGREEMENT AND EQUITABLE
APPORTIONMENT: THE SUPREME
COURT PUTS A NEW LOOK ON
THIRD PARTY RIGHTS
PREMISE LIABILITY FOR ACCUMULATING
"SLUSH": THE CONTINUING DRAMA
OF NATURAL CONDITION IMMUNITY
Richard C. Turkington*
Professor Turkington explains in detail three recent Illinois Supreme
Court cases which may have significant impact on Illinois tort law as pos-
sible bases for restricting further actions by non-users in products liability
cases and circumventing the no-contribution rule for joint tortfeasors in
Illinois. The author also discusses problems facing the Illinois courts as
reflected in cases involving owner-occupier liability for injuries caused by
natural conditions, application of contributory negligence without a jury
determination, and special damages in per se defamation cases.
INTRODUCTION
ins was an active term for torts in Illinois although the
results generally were what should have been expected. The
Structural Work Act' assumed its dominant role in the con-
struction accident area in numerous appellate court cases,2 while
premise liability absorbed its usual share of appellate court re-
sources in the process of defining negligence duty within the tres-
passer, licensee and invitee rule structure.' The scope of the jury
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1971).
2. See St. John v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 54 III. 2d 271, 296 N.E.2d 740
(1973); Navylt v. Kalinich, 53 Ill. 2d 137, 290 N.E.2d 219 (1972); Weber v.
Northern Ill. Gas Co., 10 III. App. 3d 625, 295 N.E.2d 41 (1973); Halberstadt v.
Harris Trust and Say. Bank, 7 Ill. App. 3d 991, 289 N.E.2d 90 (1972); Isabelli v.
Cowless Chem. Co., 7 II. App. 3d 888, 289 N.E.2d 12 (1973).
3. See, e.g., DeMario v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 6 IlL App. 3d 46, 284
N.E.2d 330 (1972).
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function on the proximate cause and duty issue was examined in
two unusual factual situations.4  Regulars such as active-passive
negligence5 and the jury function on the contributory negligence
question made inauspicious appearances at the appellate court
level.6 Several courts struggled with application of the negligence
and strict liability theories in defective design cases with mixed
results.7
For potential impact, three Illinois Supreme Court cases stand
out this term. In Reese v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. and
Gertz v. Campbells the supreme court laid the foundation for
changing the total direction of third party rights in Illinois. How-
ever, a conceptual smog was cast onto the defective products area
when the supreme court ruled against the non-user plaintiff in Mie-
her v. Brown.9 Mieher, having languished in the judicial system
for almost two years, is an appropriate place to begin.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Second Collision Plaintiffs
The rich tradition in Illinois in the defective products area which
4. In Przbylski v. Yellow Cab Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 243, 285 N.E.2d 506 (1972),
a thirteen year old plaintiff was injured when fleeing from a cab taking an un-
familiar route to the destination. The First District Appellate Court held that the
question of proximate cause in respect to the cab driver's actions was properly sub-
mitted to the jury. In Cunis v. Brennon, 7 Ill. App. 3d 204, 287 N.E.2d 207
(1972), the plaintiff was impaled on a gas or water drain pipe protruding from the
ground after being thrown from a car in an accident. The court held that the duty
and cause question was properly submitted to the jury in an action against the city.
5. See Peoria & Eastern Ry. v. Kenworthy, 7 Ill. App. 3d 350, 287 N.E.2d 543
(1972); Carver v. Grossman, 6 IM. App. 3d 265, 285 N.E.2d 468 (1972). In Wes-
sel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 54 Ill. App. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that indemnity under the active-passive negligence con-
cept was not available to a person liable under the Dram Shop Act against an ac-
tively negligent joint tortfeasor.
6. See Wegener v. Anna, 11 Ill. App. 3d 316, 296 N.E.2d 589 (1973); Fisher
v. Lang, 9 Ill. App. 3d 696, 292 N.E.2d 915 (1973); Green v. Brown, 8 Ill. App. 3d
638, 291 N.E.2d 16 (1972); Fore v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 287
N.E.2d 526 (1972).
7. See Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110
(1973); Willeford v. Mayrath Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 357, 287 N.E.2d 502 (1972).
8. Reese v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R., No. 45293 (Ill. Sup. CL,
May, 1973); Gertz v. Campbell, - Ill. 2d -, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
9. 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
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began with Suvada v. White Motor Company ° in 1965 was dis-
rupted this term by the Illinois Supreme Court in Mieher. Mieher
presented the court with the problem of deciding whether a non-user
could successfully proceed in negligence" against the manufacturer
of a product for injuries received when the non-user was injured
from a collision with the product. The marriage of a non-user ques-
tion and a second collision question in one case provided a dramatic
opportunity for the state supreme court to tie together several loose
strands of Illinois' defective-products law.' 2  In denying that the
plaintiff in Mieher had stated a cause of action, the Supreme
Court of Illinois unfortunately made no use of this opportunity.
Esther Mieher was killed when her automobile collided with
the rear portion of a truck manufactured by the defendant. The
administrator of Ms. Mieher's estate brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against the manufacturer of the truck on the theory that the
truck had been negligently designed because of the failure to in-
clude the attachment of a bumper, fender or shield to the rear of
the vehicle. On motion of the defendant, the trial court struck the
negligent design count against the manufacturer. The plaintiff ap-
pealed and successfully pursuaded the Fifth District Appellate Court
to reverse the trial court.' 3  On appeal, the supreme court, speaking
10. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). See also Dunham v. Vaughan &
Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Il. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (which included whole-
salers); Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584
(1969) (strict products liability was applied to distributors); Sweeney v. Matthews,
94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968) (which further extended the liability to
retailers); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966)
(which extended strict products liability to design defects). In Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Il. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), the supreme court held that as-
sumption of the risk and not contributory negligence was a defense to a strict lia-
bility suit. A federal district court, in White v. Jeffery Galion, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Ill. 1971), held that under Illinois law a non-user could proceed
against the manufacturer on a strict liability theory.
11. The trial court interpreted the plaintiff's complaint as based on a strict
liability theory while the appellate court held that it was a negligent design case.
It was treated as a negligent design case by the supreme court.
12. Elucidation of the tort principle established in Suvada by the cases noted in
footnote 10 left the courts in Illinois with the job of defining the precise relationship
between negligence and strict liability in terms of: (1) the standard of liability in a
design case; (2) the defenses of misuse of the products, assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence; and (3) the status of a non-user. See generally Turking-
ton, Torts, 1971-72 Survey of Illinois Law, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 43-46 (1972).
13. 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972).
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through Justice Ryan, reversed the appellate court, with only Jus-
tice Goldenhersh dissenting.
Background: Negligence Protection for the Second Collision
Plaintiff
a. The Larsen Approach
Recognition that tort law should protect individuals who receive
injury from impact with the interior of a passenger vehicle after
there has been a collision between the vehicle and an external ob-
ject occurred in judicial opinion as early as 1926.14 Protection
against "second collision" injuries did not effectively begin, how-
ever, until after Ralph Nader's writings and the ensuing publicity
in the 1960's.15 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 6 a 1968 Eighth
Circuit decision remains the leading case imposing a duty upon
manufacturers in designing a product to take precautions against
creating unreasonable risk of injury to persons after an accident
with the product. In Larsen the plaintiff argued that the extended
length of the steering column in a Corvair created an unreasonable
risk of serious injury to the driver in the event of a crash, and thus
constituted a negligently designed product. The Eighth Circuit
agreed that, under general negligence principles,1 7 General Mo-
tors owed a duty to the plaintiff. Since then, Larsen's negligent
design theory has been used successfully on behalf of several second
collision plaintiffs. In Mickle v. Blackmon,'" the South Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed a trial court judgment notwithstanding the
verdict against a plaintiff who was permanently injured after being
impaled on the gearshift of a 1949 Ford. Likewise, a Pennsylvania
federal district court in Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,'9 denied
14. See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926).
15. See R. NAian, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965); Nader and Page, Automobile Design and the Judi-
cial Process, 55 CAL. L. REv. 645 (1967).
16. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
17. The traditional negligence test reduced to its minimum is said to involve
balancing the probability and gravity of harm against the burden on the defendant.
See generally Learned Hand's famous explication in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
18. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
19. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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General Motors' motion for a judgment on the pleadings when the
plaintiff brought an action for second collision injuries occurring
when the roof of a 1965 Buick two-door hardtop collapsed after the
car had overturned.
Recently, in an important case, Passwaters v. General Motors
Corp.,20 the Eighth Circuit applied Larsen's rationale to a plaintiff
who was injured when she was thrown from a motorcycle which col-
lided with a car manufactured by the defendant and received lacer-
ations from unshielded protrusions on the hubcaps of the vehicle.
There the Eighth Circuit reversed a directed verdict on behalf of
General Motors, and held that the plaintiff was entitled to have her
case submitted to a jury.2
b. Evans and the Intended Use Rationale
Larsen's approach of treating the risk of injury after a collision
as within the ambit of the manufacturer's general negligence duty
has been rejected in several jurisdictions. The leading case em-
bracing the view that a manufacturer has no duty toward second
collision plaintiffs is Evans v. General Motors Corp.,2 a 1966 deci-
sion where the Seventh Circuit held as a matter of law that General
Motors' duty in designing a 1961 Chevrolet station wagon did not
extend to second collision plaintiffs allegedly injured because the
car's x-type frame could not adequately protect passengers during a
side impact collision.
In refusing to protect the second collision plaintiff, the Evans
line of cases generally utilize the rationale: (a) that the manufac-
turer has no duty to produce a crash-proof car; and (b) that an
automobile which is in a collision has not been used for its intended
purpose.
The "crashworthy" car argument represents, of course, a wholly
exaggerated account of the second collision plaintiffs position. It
is not the duty to create a "crashworthy" car that is being pressed for
by such plaintiffs. Rather, the relevant duty in such cases is the
20. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
21. See also Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis.
1970); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305
(1971).
22. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
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duty to design a product which will not unreasonably increase the
risk of serious injury to an individual involved in an accident with
the product.23
The intended use rationale focuses the inquiry in a more rele-
vant direction because it raises questions concerning the foresee-
ability of second collision injuries. Application of the concept of
foreseeability in the context of liability for negligent design has pro-
duced the principle that a manufacturer's duty is limited to risks
created by normal use of the product. Thus, the manufacturer
of a wall decorating compound has no duty to anticipate risk of
injury to the user of the product if he stirs it with his finger.24
Since foreseeability is the touch stone of the intended or normal
use doctrine, 25 the doctrine ought not, as a general matter, pre-
clude recovery in second collision cases. This conclusion would
seem to inescapably follow from the regularity with which motor
vehicles are involved in accidents. The Eighth Circuit in Larsen
stated the matter aptly:
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each
other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use
will result in collisions and injury producing impacts. . . . Where the
injuries or enhanced injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure to use
reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its product to an unrea-
sonable risk of injury, general negligence principles should be applicable.
The sole function of an automobile is not just to provide a means of trans-
portation, it is to provide a means of safe transportation or as safe as is
reasonably possible under the present state of the art.26
Foreseeability has not been a dominant consideration in applica-
tion of the intended use doctrine to cut off manufacturer liability
in second collision cases. As noted by the court in Evans, "[tihe
intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation
in collision with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to
foresee the possibility that such collision may occur. "27
23. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968).
24. See Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D. N.Y. 1931).
25. The manufacturer must take precuations against risk created by some un-
common uses of the product if the risk is foreseeable. See Phillips v. Ogle Alumi-
num Furn. Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951); cf. Ringstad v. I.
Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952) (robe in proximity of the
kitchen stove).
26. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 405, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
27. 359 F.2d at 825.
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This perversion of the intended use doctrine by Evans suggests
that the doctrine is used to mask inarticulated policy considera-
tions. The failure of the Evans line of cases to spell out exactly
what these policy considerations are has done much to obscure the
choice of values which are at stake in second collision cases.
c. The Supreme Court's Rationale in Mieher
Larsen and Evans then represented the two lines of authority
available to the supreme court in Mieher. Larsen extended a duty to
second collision plaintiffs consistent with general negligence theory,
while Evans used the intended use doctrine to immunize the manu-
facturer. Which approach did the Illinois Supreme Court adopt?
Is Illinois a Larsen or Evans jurisdiction on the second collision is-
sue after Mieher? A clear answer may not be be found in the opin-
ion. Instead the court suggests that the facts of the case are dis-
tinguishable from the general factual pattern represented by Evans
and Larsen. In a passage which promises much more than it de-
livers, the court states:
The question in Larsen and Evans concerned the duty of the manufac-
turer to design a vehicle in which it was safe to ride. The question in
our case involves the duty of a manufacturer to design a vehicle with
which it is safe to collide.28
This statement suggests that the critical distinguishing fact be-
tween Mieher, and the Larsen and Evans decisions is that the suing
plaintiff in Mieher was a non-user of the product. Essentially this
is the "collide" and "ride" language the court distills down to.
Thus, after Mieher Illinois is left with the proposition that a man-
ufacturer has no legal duty in designing a product to take precau-
tions against creating unreasonable risk of injury to non-users of the
product in the event the product is in an accident. As noted previously,
the Eighth Circuit extended Larsen to a non-user in Passwaters v.
General Motors Corp.29 Although Passwaters was relied upon substan-
tially by the plaintiffs in their brief, it was not discussed or even
noted by the supreme court in their opinion.
By distinguishing Larsen and Evans, the supreme court has left
28. 54 Ill. 2d at -, 301 N.E.2d at 309.
29. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
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TORTS
the second collision issue still viable in Illinois. Yet the decision
casts considerable doubt on the direction Illinois is likely to go in
the defective products area. This doubt is created in Mieher pri-
marily because of the absence of a sound rationale for the "collide"
and "ride" basis the court is using to distinguish Larsen and
Evans. In one part of the opinion the court suggests two reasons
for denying protection to the non-user second collision plaintiff:
(1) the unforeseeability of injury to such a plaintiff; and (2) that
imposing such a duty on the manufacturer would be against public
policy. As stated by the court: "Public Policy and the social re-
quirements do not require that a duty be placed upon the manufac-
turer of this truck to design his vehicle so as to prevent injuries from
the extraordinary occurrences of this case." 0
Distinguishing the injured occupant of the 1961 Corvair in Lar-
sen and the injured occupant of the automobile in Mieher on the
basis of the foreseeability of the injury sued upon is not persuasive.
Foreseeability is an open-ended imprecise concept"' but it hardly
seems arguable that injury to the driver of an automobile after a col-
lision with the back of a large truck which is not equipped with a
bumper is an extraordinary occurrence. It simply will not do to dis-
tinguish the plaintiff in Larsen from the plaintiff in Mieher on for-
seeability grounds. Rear end collisions are too common.
The policy rationale suggested in this quote from Mieher seems
equally insubstantial. Common law judges often do, of course, util-
ize factors other than forseeability in defining the scope of duty in
a negligence case. 2 The economic burden placed upon the de-
fendant and upon other resources of society by the imposition of a
duty may offset foreseeability in the duty analysis. If it is economic
policy that is being implemented in Mieher, there is nothing to in-
30. 54 Ill. 2d at -, 301 N.E.2d at 310.
31. See generally Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. Rv.
1401 (1961); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. Rav. 1 (1953); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
32. Negligence theory contemplates judicial cognizance, through interpreting the
elements of negligence-primarily duty and cause-of such factors as: (1) foresee-
ability of harm; (2) the certainty of the plaintiff's injury; (3) the nexus between the
defendant's conduct and injury; (4) the moral blame attached to the parties con-
duct and the injury; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the burden on
the defendant and the consequences to the community in imposing liability and
(7) the availability cost and prevalence of insurance. Compare the more basic re-
stricted view of the negligence formula discussed in footnote 16 supra.
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dicate what that policy is. No cost analysis is found in the opinion.
At least one writer has suggested that no figures are available from
manufacturers as to the cost of protecting against second collision in-
juries.88 If it is not economic policy in Mieher that the court is im-
plementing, what policy is it? One cannot find the answer in the
opinion.
As a guide to Illinois policy in defective products cases Mieher is
not satisfactory. The court apparently has decided to draw the line
in the defective products area, but exactly where is not clear. The
parties to the dispute in Mieher-manufacturers, distributors, insur-
ance companies and injured Illinois citizens similarly situated to the
plaintiff-expect that disputes in the defective products area will
be resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in a way which is con-
sistent with previously articulated judicial policy.84 The supreme
court in Mieher does not satisfy these expectations.
B. Strict Liability for Defectively Designed Products
Mieher was presented to the supreme court as a negligent design
case. In 1966, Illinois extended the principle of strict liability in
tort to the design of the product in Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc. 3
The continued viability of this tort action was dramatically attested
to this term in Reese v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R.36 where
the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a $159,000 judgment in a
wrongful death action brought in strict liability for defective de-
sign.
Since the conception of the strict liability theory in 1966, appel-
late courts in Illinois have struggled with defining the interrelation
between defective design product cases where the theory of recov-
ery is negligence and defective design cases where the theory of re-
covery is strict liability. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.17
seems almost hopelessly bogged down with the problem. In the
initial appellate court opinion, 8 the fifth district suggested that con-
33. Nader and Page, supra note 15, at 645, 673.
34. 54 Il. 2d at -, 301 N.E.2d at 308. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill. 2d 612, 614, 210 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1965).
35. 68 I1. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
36. No. 45293 (Ill. Sup. Ct., May, 1973).
37. 45 Il1. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
38. 93 II1. App. 2d 334, 347, 236 N.E.2d 125, 133 (1968).
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tributory negligence was a defense to strict liability. The supreme
court in Williams, however, held that assumption of the risk and
not contributory negligence was a defense to strict liability.8 9
The problem of sorting these two tort theories in the context of
defective design cases continues to surface. Last term, the Fifth
District Appellate Court and the Third District Appellate Court
took contrary positions on the question as to whether the evidence
rule generally applicable to negligence cases on the admissibility of
post accident safety measure was to apply to a cause of action
brought in strict liability for defective design.40  At least one
case this term continued to litigate the question of contributory negli-
gence versus assumption of the risk as a defense to strict liability. 41
This term the First District Appellate Court found itself having
to define precise relations between the two torts in respect to the rele-
vance of "custom" or the "state of arts" defense in Gelsumino v.
E. W. Bliss Co. 41 That court reversed a trial court decision to grant
summary judgments for the defendants. One of the questions on
appeal was whether the evidence produced by the defendant to show
that the product was designed in a way which was customary in
the industry established, as a matter of law, that no cause of action
was established in negligence or strict liability for defective de-
sign. The First District Appellate Court's answer was that proof
that a design conforms to the industry is not sufficient to sustain a
summary judgment on either the strict liability or negligence the-
ory.43
INDEMNITY---CONTRIBUTION
Since at least 1923, Illinois has refused to allow contribution
among joint tortfeasors.14  The harshness of the Illinois no-contri-
bution rule has been responded to by an expansion of the right to
39. 45 Ill. 2d at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 310 (1970).
40. See Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 IlL. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d
749 (1972); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 111. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d
828 (1971).
41. See Willeford v. Mayrath Co., 7 111. App. 3d 357, 287 N.E.2d 502 (1972).
42. 10111. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
43. Id. at 609, 295 N.E.2d at 113.
44. See generally Polelle, Contributions Amongst Negligent loint Tortfeasors in
Illinois, 1 LoYOLA U. Cm. L.J. 267 (1970).
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indemnity under the active-passive negligence doctrine. Active-
passive negligence is an indemnity concept which allows the pas-
sively negligent joint tortfeasor to recover from the actively negli-
gent tortfeasor by indemnification. Active-passive negligence has
been criticized45 as a misuse of the indemnity principle since it
shifts the total responsibility for the injury from one tortfeasor who
was at fault to another.
A. Equitable Apportionment: Gertz v. Campbell
In a case of first impression in Illinois, the supreme court rec-
ognized the third party concept of "equitable apportionment" in a
decision which will grant some relief from the strictures of the active-
passive doctrine. The problem presented to the supreme court
arose from a narrow factual situation.
In Gertz v. Campbell,46 the plaintiff sued in negligence for per-
sonal injuries resulting from the defendant allegedly striking the
plaintiff while he was standing alongside the road. The defendant
Campbell filed a third party complaint against the treating physi-
cian alleging malpractice and seeking indemnity for damages as-
sessed against him which were caused by the third party defendant
doctor's negligence. A trial judge dismissed the third party action
without leave to amend but was reversed by the Second District
Appellate Court47 which held that Campbell had stated a cognizable
claim for "equitable apportionment." On appeal, the Illinois Su-
preme Court affirmed, with Justice Underwood and Justice Ryan
concurring in a separate opinion.
Writing for the court, Justice Ward responded to the argument
that Campbell's third party complaint was at odds with the no-con-
tribution policy in Illinois by focusing primarily on the special na-
ture of the relationship between the defendants in a case like Gertz
involving the intervening negligent act of a physician.
Where a negligent act is followed by the negligence of a treating
physician in Illinois the original negligent tort-feasor is liable for
45. See generally Turkington, supra note 12, at 46-48. See also Comment, Allo-
cation of Loss Among Joint Tort-Feasors, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 728 (1967-68).
46. - Ill. 2d -, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
47. See 4 ill. App. 3d 806, 282 NE.2d 28 (1972). The appellate court decision
was written by Judge Seidenfeld, with Judges Guild and Moran concurring.
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the negligence of the treating physician. For purposes of proxi-
mate cause the intervening act of the physician is treated as a fore-
seeable intervening force because the original negligent act created
the emergency and some risk of injury by a treating physician.4"
In such cases a form of joint liability is imposed on the parties; the
original negligent tortfeasor is liable for the damages caused by his
act as well as the aggravated damages caused by the physician's
act, while the physician is liable only for the damages produced by
his negligence. Both parties then are jointly liable for the damages
caused by the physician.
This limited sense of joint liability was found by Justice Ward to
be different from the sense of joint liability used in Illinois decisions
prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors.49
Additionally, the third party defendant had argued for dismis-
sal of the indemnity complaint because of Campbell's active negli-
gence. Since Gertz initially struck the plaintiff, he could not recover
against the physician under the active-passive negligence indemmity
concept.50 To this argument Justice Ward said that indemnity in
Illinois was not restricted to cases of active-passive negligence or
joint liability based upon agency principles. 51 Citing California 2
and New York53 cases with approval, Justice Ward added the con-
cept of equitable apportionment to the conceptual armory of third
party rights in Illinois:
[W]e do not consider that the right to indemnity must be unalterably re-
stricted to the outlines . . . described. The right should be capable of de-
48. See Variety Mfg. Co. v. Landaker, 227 Ill. 22, 81 N.E. 47 (1907); Chicago
City Ry. Co. v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274, 72 N.E. 755 (1904).
49. Justice Ward noted: "There was no concert in the conduct of Campbell
and Dr. Snyder. Inter alia, neither had control over the acts of the other; the
plaintiff's cause of action is based on claimed violations of different duties owed the
plaintiff by the original tortfeasor and the physician. The wrongful conduct and the
injuries sustained were at different times. The physician in a case as here is not
liable for the negligence of the original tortfeasor." - Ill. 2d at -, 302 N.E.2d
at 43.
50. Active-passive indemnity is available only if the tortfeasor using it is pas-
sively negligent and the tortfeasor against which it is used is actively negligent.
See generally Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Spivack v.
Hara, 69 111. App. 2d 22, 216 N.E.2d 173 (1963).
51. - Ill. 2d at -, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
52. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
53. See Clark v. Halstead, 76 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1949); Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
4751973] TORTS
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
velopment to meet perceived requirements for just solutions in questions
involving multiple tortfeasors. The historical aversion of courts to com-
pare the fault of tortfeasors when contribution or indemnity has been
sought has not prevented them from developing concepts which allow in-
demnity when equity required. 54
Justices Underwood and Ryan joined in a concurring opinion
to express disapproval of the court's expansion of Illinois indemnity
principles to include the "potentially troublesome" concept of equit-
able apportionment. Both agreed, however, that Gertz had a cause
of action against the negligent physician based upon subrogation
to the rights of the injured plaintiff.55
Gertz will be viewed initially, at least, as standing for the limited
proposition that indemnity is available under an equitable appor-
tionment theory in those few cases where the original tortfeasor's
negligence combines with the intervening negligent act of a treating
physician. There are indications in Gertz, however, that the su-
preme court will be amenable to expanding use of the concept be-
yond the facts of the case.
In particular, the opinion strongly suggests that equitable appor-
tionment could ultimately supplant active-passive negligence. In
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,5 6 the New York Court of Appeals re-
cently supplanted active-passive negligence with equitable appor-
tionment as an indemnity criterion. The use of equitable appor-
tionment by the court in Dole was cited with approval by the fl-
linois Supreme Court in Gertz.
Equitable apportionment has rather obvious advantages over active-
passive negligence where indemnity from a third party is sought.
The sufficiency of a third party indemnity complaint ought to turn
upon whether a demonstrable tort interest is promoted by shifting
the total loss from the third party plaintiff to the third party de-
fendant. Generally, indemnity is used as between joint tortfeasors
to promote the tort interest in deterrence.
Where a master is liable for the torts of a servant, indemnity is
available against the servant and in this way the loss is borne by
the individual who could have prevented the injury by exercising
54. - ll. 2d at -, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
55. Id. at -, 302 N.E.2d at 46.
56. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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reasonable care, i.e., the person whose conduct might have been
deterred. Active-passive negligence inhibits the development of a
rational indemnity policy because it places emphasis on physical mo-
tion associated with the parties' conduct. This obscures the crucial
issue-will a demonstrable tort interest be promoted by shifting the
total cost from the third party plaintiff to the third party defendant?
Active-passive negligence may sometimes be used to properly shift
the total loss to the tortfeasor with the deterrable conduct. In cases
under the Structural Work Act, for example, where liability is based
upon a failure to discover or remedy defects, active-passive indem-
nity has been used to shift the total loss from the nominally at fault
tortfeasor to the tortfeasor whose negligence primarily caused the
injury.5 17 Inspection may be so impratcical and/or inefficient that
the passive tort-feasor's conduct is essentially non-deterrable. In
such cases the passive tortfeasor's conduct happens to be non-deter-
rable and the concept operates to properly shift the burden of the
loss so as to promote the tort interest in deterrence. But many
times passive conduct is deterrable and shifting the total loss to the
active tortfeasor becomes a useless judicial exercise.5"
Much of the confusion in Illinois third party law caused by the
active-passive doctrine could be eliminated by the use of equitable
apportionment, which places a direct focus on whether a demon-
stratable tort interest is promoted by allowing the indemnity claim.
Gertz is an example of a soundly reasoned elaboration of a rational
indemnity policy. In considering Campbell's right of indemnity
against the doctor, Justice Ward pointed out that Campbell had no
control over the doctor's conduct and could have done nothing to
prevent the negligence of the physician. Requiring Campbell to as-
sume the total loss for injuries caused by the doctor unjustly en-
riches the doctor and immunizes from economic responsibility the
party who has the deterrable conduct in respect to the aggravated
injuries. Gertz may well represent the beginning of an approach to
indemnity which turns upon whether the third party plaintiff can
57. See Gadd v. John Hancock Multiple Life Ins. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 152,
275 N.E.2d 285 (1971). See also Turkington, Torts, 1971-72 Survey of Illinois
Law, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 29, 46-59 (1972).
58. See Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322
(1964). Cf. Steward v. Mister Softee, 75 Ill. App. 2d 328, 221 N.E.2d 11 (1966).
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demonstrate on the basis of the facts of each case that shifting the
loss to the third party defendant would promote a legitimate tort
interest. That is the essence of equitable apportionment as it is used
by the cases cited with approval in Gertz.59
B. Loan Agreements: Covenant to Sue the Other Person First
In addition to Gertz, the supreme court decided a case which may
provide joint tortfeasors with an even more significant route around
the no-right to contribution rule.60
In Reese the plaintiffs decedent, Lowell Reese, was killed when a
1200 pound bucket suspended from a crane fell and struck him.
The dedecent was an employee of the Chicago Burlington & Quincy
Railroad and was supervising the loading of railroad cars by rail-
road employees when he died. Suit was brought by the plaintiff
against the railroad, under the Federal Employers Liability Act,,'
and the manufacturer of the crane for defective design in both neg-
ligence and strict liability. The railroad counterclaimed against the
crane manufacturer for indemnity. Immediately before the trial
the plaintiff and the railroad executed an agreement in which the
railroad company loaned $57,500 without interest to the plaintiff
in exchange for a promise to use any reasonable means available
to collect the judgment against the defendant crane manufacturer.62
59. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493
(1964); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972). See also Comment, Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortleasors,
41 So. CAL. L. REv. 728 (1967-68).
60. Reese v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R., No. 45293 (InI. Sup. Ct.,
May, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
61. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-61 (1939).
62. The important provisions of the loan agreement read:
Vella J. Reese, as administratrix of the estate of Lowell Isaac Reese, De-
ceased, and Vella J. Reese, individually hereby acknowledges receipt from
Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company for the sum of Fifty-
Seven Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($57,500.60) as a
loan without interest which said sum I promise to pay from any judgment I
am legally entitled to collect from Koehring Company, Schield Bantam
Division, a corporation, provided that I shall have no obligation to pay said
sum from that amount of any judgment I obtain against Koehring
Company, Schield Bantam Division, a corporation, which exceeds Fifty-
Seven Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($57,500.00). I
further agree that I shall use and pursue any reasonable and legal means
which are available to me to collect any judgment I obtain against Koehring
Company, Schield Bantam Division, a Corporation.
Reese at 2.
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Upon plaintiffs request, the defendant railroad was dismissed from
the case. The trial court awarded $149,000 against the crane
manufacturer and held that the loan agreement was a covenant not
to sue which reduced the crane manufacturer's obligation to the
plaintiff by the amount of the loan. On appeal, the Second District
Appellate Court affirmed the judgment against the crane manu-
facturer but reversed the trial court's decision that the loan agree-
ment was a covenant not to sue. The Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed the appellate court decision on both the judgment and oper-
ative effect of the loan agreement with Justices Schaefer, Ward and
Ryan dissenting. 3
In upholding the validity of the "loan agreement" between the
plaintiff and a potential joint tortfeasor the supreme court recog-
nized the implications of the decision in regard to the no-contribu-
tion rule:
Contribution between joint-tortfeasors does not exist in Illinois, except in
those cases where a tortfeasor whose negligence was "passive" may be en-
titled to indemnification from a tortfeasor whose negligence was "active."
Where the facts do not fall within that exceptional class of cases appro-
priate for indemnification, it may fairly be argued that a loan agreement
permits a joint tortfeasor to achieve by indirection that which he could not
do directly. In short, he may thus avoid an adjudication of liability and
his joint-tortfeasor may ultimately stand the entire loss.6 4
However the supreme court found that the "loan agreements" pro-
moted tort interests that outweigh Illinois policy against contribu-
tion among joint tort feasors.
Thus framed, the question becomes whether our policy of denying contri-
bution between joint-tortfeasors outweighs the considerations favoring pri-
vate settlements of lawsuits. We think it does not.65
The impact of loan agreements on the private settlement of per-
sonal injury suits hardly seems as certain as this passage from the
opinion suggests. Loan agreements may arguably operate to pro-
duce attitudes in the parties which would work against settlement
and thus unnecessarily complicate litigation. If a plaintiff enters
into a loan agreement with a potential tortfeasor he is motivated by
the need for quick money. The tortfeasor who enters into a loan
63. The dissenting opinions were not available as of this printing and there-
fore not included in this analysis.
64. Reese at 5 [citations omitted].
65. Id. at 5.
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agreement will probably do so only if the prospect of a judgement
against him is likely. Since a loan agreement, unlike a covenant not
to sue, does not deprive the tort plaintiff of his right to sue the party
to the agreement, it is unlikely that a party defendant with ques-
tionable liability would put up money for a "loan agreement." Typ-
ically, then, as in Reese, the general context of a "loan agreement"
will include a plaintiff in need of money before judgment, a defen-
dant likely to be liable, and, of course, a defendant other than the
party to the loan agreement whom the plaintiff can proceed against.
In this general situation, the loan agreement hardly seems to promote
settlement of the suit before trial. The plaintiff, of course, is effec-
tively precluded from settling with the defendant for less than the
amount of the loan agreement because he has promised to pursue his
remedy against the remaining defendants and to pay the loan back
from the judgment. The defendant who loaned the money has a
strong interest in continuing the litigation. Those defendants who are
not part of the agreement then are left with a plaintiff who is obligated
to proceed against them and a potential joint tortfeasor who has
invested a large sum of money to cause a total shifting of the loss to
them by further litigation. Not much is left to these defendants to
use as leverage for an out-of-court settlement. Ironically, Reese itself
proceeded to trial despite the "loan agreement."
a. Collusion
Beyond this, "loan agreements" such as the one sustained by the
supreme court in Reese present serious threats to the integrity and
adversary nature of the proceedings through collusion among the
parties to the agreement. The court in Reese explicitly recognized
the collusion problem inherent in such agreements:
It seems not unlikely that, where a defendant has executed a loan receipt
agreement with a plaintiff who thereupon dismisses that defendant and
proceeds against the remaining ones, the employees and wiitnesses of the
dismissed defendant may be substantially more cooperative with plaintiff
than would otherwise be true, since any recovery by that defendant of the
loaned amount is frequently contingent upon plaintiff's success against the
remaining defendants. 66
The court concluded, however, that adequate protection against
collusion existed in the cross-examination process if the defendant
66. Md. at 6,
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was permitted to establish that the witness knew of the loan agree-
ment and may be biased as a result of it. This important aspect
of the holding in Reese grants the defendant the right to show the
existence of a "loan agreement" during cross-examination of the
witnesses in order to establish motive and credibility. The agree-
ment could not be introduced to establish liability or damages. Ap-
propriate instructions would define the scope of admissability of the
loan agreement.
While cross-examination may provide a partial check against
false or otherwise incredulous testimony, it is by no means certain
that the skills of a trial lawyer in cross-examination will be sufficient
to overcome the pressure created by "loan agreements" on witnesses
who have economic ties with the parties. This would particularly
be true in a case like Reese, where the evidence as to what hap-
pened to cause the death of the plaintiff is completely in the control
of witnesses who are employees of a person who has an interest
in a prospective judgment against the defendant.
b. Epilogue
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Gertz and
Reese to third party litigation in Illinois. After these decisions, the
total direction of third party rights in Illinois will almost certainly
change. As previously mentioned, Gertz arises from a narrow fac-
tual pattern, and "loan agreements" will not be practical alterna-
tives to some tortfeasors. But Gertz and Reese represent unmistak-
able statements of dissatisfaction in the Illinois Supreme Court
with the no-contribution policy and active-passive indemnity. Ju-
dicial undercurrent undoubtedly goes much deeper. One might
even speculate that the court would be receptive to reconsidering
Maki v. Frelk.67
NEGLIGENCE
A. Owner/Occupier
a. Natural Conditions
In the First Annual Illinois Torts Survey, several appellate court
cases in the owner-occupier area were examined with a view toward
67. 40 111. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
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illustrating the built-in historical infirmities of the licensee-trespas-
ser-invitee rule structure that continues to dominate the premise
liability area. 8 DeMario v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 9 a First Dis-
trict Appellate Court decision this term, again exposes to plain
view the conceptual quagmire faced by a judge who is required to
apply nineteenth century concepts to twenty-first century problems.
During the last half of the nineteenth century, in both America and
England, immunity was generally extended to owners or occupiers
of property for injuries occurring from natural conditions to persons
on their property. 70 At that time much land was unsettled or un-
cultivated. The rule reflected the view that a general duty to in-
spect the property would place an unreasonable burden on the own-
er or occupier of such property. Despite dramatic differences in eco-
nomic and social relations in the twentieth century, the rule con-
tinues to enjoy general acceptance in America. Illinois appellate
courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the natural condition immunity.7
Personal safety and compensatory interests have pressed to the
surface in the development of a major qualification on the natural
condition immunity. When the owner or occupier engages in ac-
tivities which alter natural conditions, these alterations are treated
as "artificial" for which the owner may be liable.72  This important
qualification on the natural condition immunity doctrine has been
applied in Illinois against the owner/occupier in several cases."
68. See Turkington, supra note 12, at 30-39.
69. 6 Ill. App. 3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330 (1972).
70. See, e.g., Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 149 Mass. 103, 21 N.E. 230 (1889);
Mohr v. Gault, 10 Wis. 455 (1860). See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 354-56
(4th ed. 1971).
71. See generally Byrne v. Catholic Bishop, 131 Ill. App. 2d 356, 266 N.E.2d
708 (1971); Sims v. Block, 94 111. App. 2d 215, 236 N.E.2d 572 (1968); Zide v.
Jewel Tea Co., 39 Il1. App. 2d 217, 188 N.E.2d 383 (1963); Fitzsimons v. National
Tea Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961); Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 1 Ill.
2d 133, 115 N.E.2d 288 (1953); Kelly v. Huyvaert, 323 I1. App. 643, 56 N.E.2d
638 (1944).
72. See, e.g., Coates v. Chinn, 51 Cal. 2d 304, 332 P.2d 289 (1958); McCarthy
v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 58 A.2d 49 (1948): Bailey v. Blacker, 267 Mass. 73,
165 N.E. 699 (1929); Tremblay v. Harmony Mills, 171 N.Y. 598, 64 N.E. 501
(1902).
73. See generally Graham v. Chicago, 346 II. 638, 178 N.E. 911 (1931); Hub-
bard v. Wood River, 244 Il1. App. 414, 417 (1927); Loyd v. East St. Louis, 235
Ill. App. 353, 357 (1925).
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b. Accumulating Snow and Ice
The artificial condition doctrine has been important in providing
some protection for the business invitee who is injured from falling
on accumulated ice or snow on commercial property. Of course,
for the snow or ice to be "artificial" within the meaning of the rule,
the plaintiff must establish that the snow or ice which caused the
injury was produced by some activity of the owner on the prop-
erty.74 Despite the difficulties inherent in such a requirement,
plaintiffs have been successul in several cases where accumulating
ice is the product of water discharged by the owner. 5  A slippery
passage-way caused by laundry bags being dragged across the side-
walk was treated as an artificial condition by the First District Ap-
pellate Court in one case."
In the general context of injuries occurring to customers on
property due to accumulations produced by snow-clearing activities
by the owner, the rule has received some use. Perhaps the lead-
ing case applying the artificial conditions rule to snow clearing
activities is Fitzsimons v. National Tea Co.,77 a 1961 decision. In
Fitzsimons the Second District Appellate Court affirmed a trial
court judgment on behalf of a customer injured from falling on ice
in a National Tea Company parking lot. The plaintiff was able
to introduce strong circumstantial evidence to establish that the ice
which caused the injury was produced by the defendant's activities
on the property. The ice upon which the plaintiff fell was de-
scribed as "rough and dark," and "rutted" with "ridges" made by
wheels of automobiles. It was shown that National Tea Company
had plowed snow into a pile where it remained for two weeks during
a period of alternating freezing and thawing weather. Evidence
was introduced to show that water from melted snow regularly
froze in the parking lot area where plaintiff fell.
In 1963 the Second District Appellate Court severely limited the
scope of Fitzsimons. In Zide v. Jewel Tea Co.,78 the appellate
court reversed a $25,000 trial court judgment in favor of a plaintiff
74. Fitzsimons v. National Tea Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961).
75. Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911 (1931); cf. Ritgers
v. City of Gillespie, 350 Il. App. 485, 113 N.E.2d 215 (1953).
76. See King v. Swanson, 216 II. App. 294 (1919).
77. 29 Ill. App. 2d 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961).
78. 39 Ill. App. 2d 217, 188 N.E.2d 383 (1963).
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injured from falling on ice in a Jewel Tea parking lot. The appel-
late court found that the plaintiff had failed to introduce sufficient
evidence to show that the fall resulted from ice which had not accu-
mulated from natural causes. At trial the plaintiff testified that
she fell on the ice as she left her car in the parking lot. Two
witnesses for the defendant testified that they had observed no ice
on the parking lot. One witness testified that the plaintiff fell in a
spot covered with "hard packed snow." An employee of the defen-
dant testified that salt had been sprinkled around the entrance of the
store on several occasions on the day of the accident. The plaintiff
introduced evidence showing water accumulations in parts of the
parking lot from melting snow. An expert witness for the plaintiff
testified that there was a constant flow from the building to parts of
the parking area. No direct evidence was introduced by the plain-
tiff to show that water had accumulated on the portion of the parking
lot where the plaintiff fell. This failure was cited by the appellate
court as the basis for reversing the jury verdict.
As Fitzsimons and Zide illustrate, applications of the artificial
conditions principle to accumulating snow and ice cases, even when
snow removing activities have occurred, turn on minute qualitative
judgments about offers of evidence by the parties.
'c. Accumulating "Slush"
DeMario v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,79 decided by the First Dis-
trict Appellate Court this term presents the latest nuance in appel-
late court application of the artificial condition rule. In DeMario,
the First District Appellate Court reversed an $11,000.00 jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff. The narrow question on appeal was whether
the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence for the jury to decide
whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by "artificial" or "natural"
conditions. At trial the plaintiff testified that he slipped on slush or
ice on the step approaching an entrance to the store. Employees of
the defendant testified that snow had been cleared from the ap-
proach to the entrance of the store at approximately 9:15 A.M.
and that the walk had been checked at 11:00 A.M. with no slush or
ice having been observed.
79. 6 IUL App. 3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330 (1972).
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An employee testified that slush was on the entrance at 1:30
P.M. shortly after the accident. Despite the fact that the defendant
conceded that no snow had fallen since it was removed in the morn-
ing, the appellate court held that the plaintiff had not presented suf-
ficient evidence to send the question of whether the slush was
caused by the snow removal to the jury. To satisfy this burden, the
appellate court would apparently require in a case like DeMario,
that the plaintiff introduce evidence to show the "origin of the
slush."
The trivial distinctions upon which the parties' rights turned in
Fitzsimons, Zide and DeMario are the inevitable product of Illinois'
failure to junk the common law approach to premise liability and
impose a general duty of reasonable conduct on the part of the owner
or occupier in respect to all conditions and activities on the property.
The licensee-invitee-trespasser, natural/ artificial condition rule struc-
ture places emphasis on where the snow was piled or water melted in
respect to the plaintiffs injury. Inquiry in such cases ought to focus
on balancing the foreseeability of the injury to the business invitee
created by activities or omissions of the owner against the cost of
requiring that he do more. Imposing a duty on the owner or occu-
pier to take reasonable steps to remove fallen snow would not, as
one court has suggested, make the owner or occupier an absolute in-
surer of safe premises.80 Such an obligation would extend only to
taking reasonable steps to provide a safe place for the customer.
B. Contributory Negligence
Illinois has been a jurisdiction evidencing much judicial dissatis-
faction with the defense of contributory negligence. The height of
this dissatisfaction was depicted in Maki v. Frelk81 where a Second
District Appellate Court eliminated the defense of contributory neg-
ligence and adopted a comparative negligence standard only to have
it later reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court.82 Since the Maki
case, appellate courts have expressed their disapproval of the con-
tributory negligence rule by continuing to adopt the policy of giving
80. Foster v. George J. Cyrus & Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 274, 276 N.E.2d 38 (1971).
81. 85 Ill. App. 3d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
82. 40 IU. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445.(1968).
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the plaintiff an opportunity to present the question to the jury in
almost every case.
Each year several appellate court cases are reversed due to the
trial judges' failure to accept the policy embodied in the general
proposition that "contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of
fact for the jury."'  This term witnessed this recurring pattern in
several cases.
In Wegener v. Anna,"4 the plaintiff was struck while proceeding
west across a north-south street. The plaintiff alleged that he did
not know which light was for the pedestrians or automobiles going in
an easterly or westerly direction and that before impact he did not
see the car that struck him. The trial court entered a summary
judgment against the plaintiff on the basis that he was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. The fifth district reversed.
In Fisher v. Lang, 5 the Second District Appellate Court re-
versed a summary judgment directed to the defendant on a case
brought by the plaintiff, Fisher, for injuries sustained when a wood-
en stairway leading to the basement of a store collapsed as he was
delivering soft drinks. Evidence was introduced to establish that
the stairway was not attached at the top or the bottom and that, al-
ternatively, an elevator was available for the plaintiff to use. The
plaintiff testified that the stairway was shaky. This latter admis-
sion was treated by the Second District Appellate Court as the pri-
mary basis for the summary judgment. Judge Guild, speaking for
the court, noted that the evidence established that the plaintiff had
used the stairs without accident for several months prior to the
accident and held that the evidence presented a question of fact on
the contributory negligence question. Thus, the summary judg-
ment was improper.
In Green v. Brown, 8 the First District Appellate Court reversed
a trial court's refusal to give contributory negligence instructions to
the jury. The plaintiff was injured when the automobile she was
driving collided with the defendant's automobile at an intersec-
tion. The plaintiff testified that she saw the defendant's automo-
83. See, e.g., Morehead v. Mayron, 3 Ill. App. 3d 425, 279 N.E. 473 (1972);
Johnson v. City of Rockford, 35 Il1. App. 2d 107, 182 N.E.2d 240 (1962).
84. 11 Ill. App. 3d 316, 296 N.E.2d 589 (1973).
85. 9 Ill. App. 3d 696, 292 N..E.2d 915 (1973).
86. 8 IM. App. 3d 638, 291 N.E.2d 16 (1972).
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bile for the first time a few seconds before the collision. The de-
fendant testified that she was almost completely through the inter-
section when struck and that she failed to see the plaintiff's car until
shortly before the accident. Judge Burman, on appeal, found the
evidence sufficiently in dispute to warrant submission of the question
of contributory negligence to the jury.
Fore v. Vermeer Mfg. Co.a 7 presents the type of exceptional sit-
uation where Illinois courts will take the question from the jury. In
Fore, the plaintiff brought an action for personal injury against the
manufacturer of a threshing machine on both negligence and strict
products liability theories. The plaintiff was injured when the en-
gine stalled on a threshing machine that he was driving and threw
him off the vehicle. At the trial, the defendant moved for a sum-
mary judgment on the basis of a deposition taken from the plain-
tiff in which the plaintiff stated that he had numerous difficulties
with the brakes on the tractor, that he knew of the risk and danger of
operating the vehicle, and that he had made many complaints to his
employer concerning the inadequacies of the brakes. On the basis
of the uncontroverted deposition, the summary judgment was
granted. On appeal to the third district the trial court decision was
affirmed in an opinion written by Judge Dixon. Since the occa-
sions when a judge will take the question of contributory negli-
gence from the jury occur so rarely it is puzzling to see the ques-
tion as actively litigated as it is. Of the nearly one-hundred-twenty
appellate court cases dealing with the issue examined by the De
Paul Law Review, only seven supported a holding that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and only one of
these was a first district case.
DEFAMATION
Speech activity has received significant protection in the judicial
development of the common law tort of defamation in Illinois. The
Supreme Court of Illinois expanded the malice requirement of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan8" to private individuals one year before
the United States Supreme Court.89 The plaintiff in a defamation
87. 7 Il1. App. 3d 346, 287 N.E.2d 526 (1972).
88. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
89. See Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 111. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969); cf.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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suit must establish special damages in all cases, except those where
the utterance is defamatory on its face and of the per se category."
Moreover, the defendant gets the benefit of the "innocent construc-
tion" rule which binds the plaintiff to an innocent non-defamatory
interpretation of the utterance if it is reasonable.9' Illinois, re-
strictive defamation tort discourages plaintiffs to the extent that libel
or slander cases only infrequently reach the appellate courts. This
term three defamation cases were decided which warrant mention.
SPECIAL DAMAGES: SLANDER PER SE
In McGuire v. Jankiewicz,92 the First District Appellate Court
reversed a trial court dismissal of the plaintiff's action for slander
per se. The utterances sued upon by the plaintiff, an attorney,
arose out of two separate telephone conversations by the defendant
insurance adjustor to a client of the attorney. In one conversation
the defendant told the plaintiff's client, "you could not have chosen
a worse attorney" and in the other stated "your attorney is an ass-
hole." The appellate court, speaking through Judge Lorenz, held
that the first statement came within Illinois' slander per se rule and was
actionable without proof of special damages. Dismissal was proper
in respect to the second statement.
Special damages must be established in all cases written or oral
unless they fall within one of the four per se categories in Illinois.9"
Application of the per se category involving words which slander a
90. Slander per se in Illinois means (1) that the utterance falls within cate-
gories which in the case of oral utterances would constitute slander per se at com-
mon law and (2) that the utterance is defamatory on its face. When the statement
falls within the slander per se category the plaintiff need not plead innuendo.
See generally Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d 154, 221 N.E.2d
516 (1966) and Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207
N.E.2d 482 (1965). The per se category of utterances in Illinois include: (a)
words imputing to the party the commission of a criminal offense; (b) words
which impute some contagious disease which would exclude a person from society;
(c) words imputing unfitness to perform duties of an office or employment; and
(d) words which prejudice such party in his profession or trade. See Coursey v.
Greater Nile Township Pub. Corp., 82 Ill. App. 2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1967).
91. See generally Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir.
1962); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 11. 2d 334, 243 N.E.2d 217
(1968); John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962); Snead v.
Forbes, Inc., 2 Ill. App. 3d 22, 275 N.E.2d 746 (1971).
92. 8 Ill. App. 3d 319, 290 N.E.2d 675 (1972).
93. See generally Skolnick v. Nudelman, 95 Ill. App. 2d 293, 237 N.E.2d 804
(1968).
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person in his professional trade was in issue in McGuire. A line of
cases brought by attorneys developed the distinction between utter-
ances which are merely "name calling" from utterances which impute
a want of integrity or incapacity in the legal prosession.14  It was
upon this authority that the first district relied in sustaining the dis-
missal in respect to the second statement.
In two libel cases this term decided by the First District Apellate
Court the absolute privilege for utterances which are part of the
record in a judicial proceeding was affirmed. Wahler v. Schroeder"5
involved two attorneys suing for alleged defamatory utterances con-
tained in a reply brief of the defendants who were former clients.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff $1,000.00. On appeal the first
district reversed holding that the statements were absolutely privi-
leged. In Macie v. Clark Equipment Co.", a First District Appel-
late Court found that the allegations contained in the defense brief
of a patent infringement suit were absolutely privileged. The brief
alleged that the plaintiff had organized a corporation for the pur-
pose of bringing the infringement suit and that the corporation was
insolvent. The appellate court found these allegations pertinent to
the defense of clean hands in the patent suit and thus within the
scope of the absolute privilege extended to utterances which are
part of a judicial proceeding.
94. Id.
95. 9 Il. App. 3d 505, 292 N.E.2d 521 (1972).
96. 8 Ill. App. 3d 613, 290 N.E.2d 912 (1972).
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